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We examine the effect of political decentralization on pollution spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries.  
Upstream water use has spillover effects on downstream jurisdictions, and greater decentralization (i.e. a 
larger number of political jurisdictions managing the same river) may exacerbate these spillovers, as 
upstream communities have fewer incentives to restrain their members from polluting the river at the 
border.  We use GIS to combine a panel dataset of 9,000 water quality measures collected at 321 
monitoring stations across Brazil with maps of the evolving boundaries of the 5500 Brazilian counties to 
study (a) whether water quality degrades across jurisdictional boundaries due to increases in pollution close 
a river’s exit point out of a jurisdiction, and (b) what the net effect of a decentralization initiative on water 
quality is, once the opposing impacts of inter-jurisdictional pollution spillovers and increased local 
government budgets for cleaning up the water are taken into account.  We take advantage of the fact that 
Brazil changes county boundaries at every election cycle, so that the same river segment may cross 
different numbers of counties in different years. We find evidence of strategic enforcement of water 
pollution regulations; there is a significant increase in pollution close to the river’s exit point from the 
upstream county, and conversely a significant decrease in pollution when the measure is taken farther 
downstream from the point of entrance.  Pollution increases by 2.3% for every kilometer closer a river gets 
to the exiting border, but in the stretch within 5 kilometers of the border this increase jumps to 18.6% per 
kilometer. Thus the greatest polluting activity appears to be very close to the exiting border.  Our 
theoretical model coupled with the empirical results are strongly suggestive that these results are evidence 
of strategic spillovers rather than spurious correlation between county splits and pollution stemming from 
changing population density.  Even in the presence of such negative externalities, the net effect of 
decentralization on water quality is essentially zero, since some other beneficial by-products of 
decentralization (in particular, increased local government budgets) offsets the negative pollution spillover 
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1. Introduction 
Water is a publicly provided good of fundamental importance.  Over one billion 
people in the world lack sufficient water, and over 90 percent of sewage and 70 percent 
of industrial wastes are dumped into surface water untreated (Revenga 2000).  Diarrhea, 
whose incidence is related to the lack of access to clean water, kills 1.3 million children 
every year and accounts for 12 percent of under-5 mortality (WHO 2003).   
The hundreds of international and intra-national conflicts over water sharing 
throughout history (Wolf 2002) are symptomatic of the microeconomics of water 
quantity and quality degradation.  The flow of rivers creates ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ regions, and water conflicts are often related to the opening of a diversion 
gate upstream or the discharge of pollutants into the water as it flows downstream.  With 
negative spillovers on downstream users, water use may be ‘inefficient’ from a societal 
perspective in the absence of inter-jurisdictional coordination.   
Decentralization initiatives promoted by international organizations as a way to 
improve public service delivery (World Bank 2003, Bardhan 2002) may actually 
exacerbate cross-border spillovers once jurisdictions start making unilateral decisions.  
For example, a reduced role for the central authority in favor of sub-national (e.g. state or 
county) government management could lead to upstream water policy that promotes 
over-usage and over-pollution, as costs to downstream communities are not considered 
during planning processes.  On the other hand, if decentralization increases local 
government budgets or otherwise reallocates resources toward environmental or 
sanitation spending, it has the potential to improve water quality.  These issues are not 
unique to water quality, and are relevant for any publicly provided good with spillovers.  
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For example, local governments may under-invest in health programs if the positive 
spillover benefits of improvements in health status (e.g. Miguel and Kremer 2004) to 
those residing outside the jurisdiction are not taken into account. 
This paper empirically examines the effect of a particular form of decentralization 
- the geographic splitting of counties leading to a larger number of counties managing the 
same river segment - on negative water quality spillovers on downstream users in Brazil.  
We combine a rich panel dataset of water quality measures collected at monthly intervals 
at 321 upstream-downstream pairs of monitoring stations located in all eight major river 
basins across Brazil with GIS maps of evolving county boundaries to examine (a) 
whether water quality degrades due to increases in pollution close a river’s exit point out 
of a jurisdiction, and (b) the net effect of decentralization on water quality, accounting for 
both spillovers and budgetary impacts. We find substantial evidence that Brazilian 
counties strategically pollute close to the river’s downstream exit point out of the county 
(and conversely, remain clean at upstream locations where the river enters the county), 
but no evidence that the decentralization initiative causes an overall deterioration in water 
quality, suggesting the presence of offsetting budgetary effects.   
We can replicate Sigman (2002)’s empirical approach for analyzing pollution in 
international rivers to examine whether there are differentially larger drops in quality at 
monitoring stations downstream from a jurisdictional boundary (or more generally, when 
a river crosses a larger number of boundaries).  However, the number of boundary 
crossings is likely correlated with other characteristics of the counties through which the 
river flows including major economic activities in the county, population heterogeneity, 
and environmental spending.  Some characteristics correlated with both water quality and 
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county size (which in turn is correlated with distances to county borders and boundary 
crossings) are not observed in the data and this can introduce bias in estimated spillover 
effects.1      
We then take advantage of the fact that Brazil redraws county borders (the 
number of counties increased from 4492 in 1991 to 5562 in 2001), thereby changing both 
the number of boundary crossings and distances to nearest borders for the same river 
segment over time.  This enables us to more precisely identify the effects of changes in 
proximity to borders and decentralization on the inter-temporal change in water quality 
deterioration by controlling for fixed effects for each station-pair (or the river segment 
defined by that pair).  Since each county has some policy-making authority over 
environmental regulatory standards and over sanitation spending, the splitting of counties 
leads to de facto decentralization in the sense that more separate jurisdictions gain control 
over water quality in a river segment.2  Management of water at the baseline is already 
somewhat “decentralized” in the usual sense of the word, but examining the effects of 
changes in distances to borders and in the number of counties managing the same water is 
a particularly useful way of honing in on the inter-jurisdictional spillover effects. 
Our dependent variable is the change in Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) 
from the upstream to the downstream location in each station pair: 
ud BODBODBOD −=∆ .
3  For the same station-pair the county re-districting can change 
                                                 
1 Sigman (2002) notes the need to include monitoring station fixed effects to account for such 
heterogeneity, but is unable to do so since her border variables of interest do not vary over time.  
2 Sigman (2004) on the other hand uses variation in which U.S. states are authorized to enforce Clean 
Water Act regulations to study the border spillover effects stemming from such authorization.  This allows 
her to control for a station-fixed effect, but since distances to borders do not vary over time, that variable 
remains omitted, which may be of concern if the placement of monitoring stations is not random. 
3 Sigman (2002) also uses BOD to study pollution in international rivers. BOD is relatively easily measured 
by standard procedures, helping to ensure data quality. BOD tends to travel farther downstream than some 
other pollutants, which makes it appropriate for a study on inter-jurisdictional spillovers.  We use ∆BOD 
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the distance the river traverses in the “upstream county” (i.e. where the upstream station 
is located), the distance traversed in the “downstream county”, and the number of county 
boundary crossings between the pair of stations. We use variation in all three dimensions 
in order to analyze both strategic pollution spillovers and the net effect on water quality 
from the decentralization that results from county splitting.  The theoretical framework 
we develop shows that under strategic behavior, counties shift polluting activity to near 
their downstream exit border and remain clean in the upstream part of their own 
jurisdiction.  Thus pollution level in the upstream county would be greater when 
measured closer to the exit border, and conversely, pollution level in the downstream 
county should be lower when measured further away from the upstream entering border. 
We find strong statistical evidence for both effects, suggesting the presence of spillovers 
due to such strategic behavior by counties.  Further our theory also suggests that under 
strategic pollution shifting, water quality should fall more dramatically in the upstream 
county the closer we get to the exiting border, and our regression estimates indicate 
precisely this type of dynamic for changes in BOD in Brazilian rivers.  When we allow 
for non-linear effects of distance to border, we find that BOD increases by 2.3% for every 
kilometer closer a river gets to the exiting border, but in the stretch within 5 kilometers of 
the border this increase jumps to 18.6% per kilometer. Thus the greatest polluting activity 
appears to be very close to the exiting border.      
In spite of such clear evidence on cross-boundary spillovers, we find that the net 
effect on water quality of having extra boundary crossings induced by county splitting is 
                                                                                                                                                 
(rather than, say, BODd) as the dependent variable since pollution at any point on a river is determined by 
the entire “spatial history” of the river (tributary inflows and dumping at any point upstream), and BODu 
acts as an effective control variable for the determinants of pollution anywhere upstream of point u.  Our 
empirical models are then left with the simpler task of explaining the change in pollution from the upstream 
point to the downstream point as a function of the characteristics of counties in between the two points.  
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statistically indistinguishable from zero.  County splitting may be associated with 
potentially countervailing benefits from (a) the increased aggregate public services 
budgets that accompany decentralization, and (b) the possibly greater homogeneity in 
population that results.  Each county in Brazil receives a fixed transfer from upper-level 
governments in addition to a portion of the taxes collected in their jurisdiction.  Thus the 
replacement budget for the smaller counties after a split exceeds the original county’s 
budget.  County fixed effects regressions show that per-capita sanitation spending 
increases by 20% in counties that are split, which potentially explains the improvement in 
water quality offsetting the negative spillover effects.  Further we find that the net effect 
of decentralization on water quality is negative when we condition on monitoring stations 
located closer to borders (as opposed to the nil effect in the full sample).  Close-to-border 
is also where spillovers are larger, so this further buttresses the case that there appears to 
be a spillovers-budgets tradeoff inherent in this process of decentralization.    
 A key concern with our estimation strategy is whether factors correlated with 
increases in pollution affect a county’s propensity to split.  For example, increasing 
population density may be correlated with both the propensity to split and with changes 
in pollution.  It is not obvious that such a story would explain the specific pattern of 
strategic pollution shifting we report (that pollution increases non-linearly and more 
dramatically in the upstream county the closer we get to the exiting border), but 
nonetheless we want to be as careful as possible in differentiating evidence of true 
strategic behavior from spurious correlations.  We therefore theoretically model this 
specific form of endogeneity (where a jurisdictional split occurs endogenously in an area 
with high population density), and examine the spatial pattern of pollution both upstream 
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and downstream of county borders that would result under scenarios where endogenous 
population density-induced pollution is present, and in another scenario where it isn’t.  
This yields an empirical test of that particular form of endogeneity (that splits occur in 
high density areas), and the data show that the specific spatial pattern of pollution that we 
report is not consistent with the hypothesis that endogeneity due to population density is 
the main driver of the relationship between decentralization and pollution spillovers.    
In the absence of a suitable instrument for county splitting we also adapt the 
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) methods to assess the potential bias in our estimates from 
the possibility that counties split for other unobserved reasons correlated with water 
quality.  If the selection on county splits due to the set of observed explanatory variables 
(e.g. changes in population density or GDP per capita) is any guide, then the bias 
stemming from unobservable determinants of county splits is not likely to be very large, 
and can explain away only a small portion of our results on spillovers.  Finally, we also 
conduct sensitivity checks to ensure that these results are not driven either by the 
selective addition of new stations in areas where the pollution problems are worsening, or 
extreme values of BOD measures, or by changing population density in re-districted 
counties. 
 
2.  The Literature on Decentralization and Water Quality Spillovers 
Decentralization has been one of those “buzz-words” promoted by many 
development scholars and practitioners as a way to improve public service delivery and 
rural development outcomes.  The World Bank 2004 World Development Report on 
service delivery devotes large sections to the topic, and the World Bank has also made 
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loans aimed at localization of projects, technical assistance based on local capacity 
building, and conducted budget analyses of inter-governmental transfers necessary for 
decentralization to be successful.  Many other multi-lateral development institutions have 
policies encouraging decentralization.  The UNDP’s Decentralized Governance Program 
works with national level governments to support the empowerment of local 
governments.  The FAO has a policy of prioritizing work with local governments and 
encouraging rural and local governments to take a leading role in their projects.  
However, the relative merits of decentralized versus centralized organization of public 
services remains a debated topic in the scholarly literature. At issue is balancing the 
objective of improving accountability and responsiveness of the public sector with the 
difficulty of providing public goods with benefits or costs that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Identifying conditions under which decentralization improves the efficiency 
of the public sector remains a key policy challenge. 
In its early stages, the contribution of the economics literature to the 
decentralization debate was primarily theoretical.  Oates (1972)’s seminal work on the 
topic argues that decentralization improves efficiency if it enables communities to take 
advantage of heterogeneity in preferences over public goods provision.  However, Oates 
(2001) argues that there are two major sources of inefficiency under decentralization.  It 
allows communities to ignore the externalities that they impose on other regions and it 
causes duplication in management bureaucracy.  List and Mason (2001) show that as long 
as such spillovers are not too high, decentralization will improve efficiency over a 
centralized government setting uniform pollution standards under heterogeneity in the 
costs of pollution across localities.  Coate and Besley (2000), by contrast, note that when 
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the budget is shared between localities and there is heterogeneity in preferences within 
communities, the optimal allocation of the public good need not be reached as each 
community does not pay the full marginal cost of local programs. 
 Insights from the environmental “race to the bottom” literature are also relevant 
for evaluating the merits of decentralization.  Cumberland (1981) and others have argued 
that competition between jurisdictions to attract business investment may lead to a “race 
to the bottom” in environmental quality.  In contrast, Oates (2001) suggests that a “race 
to the bottom” is unlikely to follow inter-jurisdictional competition, since environmental 
damage is capitalized into local property values, and as a result community members face 
the implicit shadow price of environmental damage even as they perceive the benefits of 
increased economic activity in their region.   
The policy-making community has noted the relative paucity of empirical 
evidence for the various arguments in favor of and against decentralization (World 
Development Report 2000).   This lack of empirical evidence is in part due to the 
difficulty of accurately measuring spillover effects, and in part a result of the 
impossibility of isolating the effect of decentralization when it is combined with a series 
of legislative reforms.      
Sigman (2002) was the first to examine water pollution spillovers across 
jurisdictional boundaries.  She finds that stations just upstream of international borders 
have higher levels of BOD than similar stations elsewhere.  However, this effect is not 
robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, and she herself warns of the dangers of 
interpreting correlations that may be driven by cross-country heterogeneity in some other 
unmeasured characteristic.  Sigman (2005) improves this identification strategy in 
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analyzing spillovers across U.S. states following the passage of the Clean Water Act.  
She uses variation in the time at which states were authorized to enforce the Clean Water 
Act within their boundaries in order to determine the impact of the decentralization of 
control over water policy.  A key identifying assumption is that authorized states are 
comparable to other states at the baseline, and the timing and choice of states to authorize 
is essentially as exogenous event.  Her estimation strategy requires identifying the 
location of monitoring stations relative to borders, and classifying each station as either 
upstream, downstream, or bordering a state boundary.  Using a fixed 50-mile distance to 
the border to classify stations, she finds that a significant number of stations can be 
categorized in more than one group (i.e. they are both upstream of one boundary and 
downstream of another).  The location of stations relative to state borders lacks any time 
variation, and empirical identification in the station-fixed-effect regressions comes from 
time variation in states’ authorization status.     
In contrast, our approach uses pairs of stations (rather than individual monitoring 
stations) as the unit of observation to examine changes in water quality from an upstream 
station to its nearest downstream station.  Classification of “upstream’ and “downstream” 
stations using GIS river flow vector maps is therefore natural and unambiguous.  In 
addition, since our identification strategy takes advantage of the evolving county 
boundaries in Brazil over time, we have time variation in each station’s distances to the 
nearest county exiting (i.e. downstream) and county-entering (i.e. upstream) borders.  We 
identify the pollution effect of distance to border solely from changes in that distance 
over time for the same monitoring station due to a change in the county boundary. This 
reduces concerns about the strategic or non-random placement of monitoring stations 
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relative to county boundaries.  Unlike Sigman (2005), this also allows us to identify the 
effect of being an additional kilometer from the border, and examine non-linear pollution 
effects by distance to border (i.e. whether pollution increases more dramatically as the 
river flows downstream very close to the exiting border as opposed to further into the 
county, away from the border).  We can also separately examine pollution attenuation 
once the river enters the downstream county, since that county has the reverse incentive 
to be more vigilant in deterring pollution at its own upstream locations close to its 
entering border.  In addition to these distance variables, we also have variation in the 
number of county boundary crossings for the same river segment over time due to the re-
drawing of county boundaries.  This variable allows us to examine the net effect of the 
decentralization initiative, accounting for both inter-jurisdictional spillovers and changes 
in characteristics of the population or increased local government budgets that 
decentralization might afford.  
Importantly, we examine the impacts of these three variables (distance to exiting 
border in the upstream county, distance to exiting border in the downstream county, and 
the number of boundary crossings) while controlling for a full set of station-pair fixed 
effects, which helps address concerns about omitted variable bias.  Station pair fixed 
effects control for time invariant differences in population heterogeneity, geography, land 
use, and local economic structure.  In addition, we directly control for changes in 
population density, county size, and GDP over time at all locations between the pair of 
stations.  There is still the possibility of bias arising from the non-random re-districting of 
counties, which we discuss in greater detail in the next section, and address in the theory 
and empirical sections.  
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3.  The Setting: Water, County Politics, and County Splitting in Brazil 
Brazil’s federal political system and the large variation in climates across its vast 
territory have meant that each region in Brazil has had a different experience with 
managing their water resources.  States have devolved control over water management at 
different rates, and have encouraged varying levels of participation by civil society.  
Several case studies evaluate the decentralization of water policy in specific regions of 
Brazil.  Brannstrom (2004) reports that decentralization policies encouraging interaction 
between all levels of government and the communities have been the most successful.  
Formiga-Johnsson and Kemper (2005) find that local sub-basin groups in the Alto-Tiete 
river basin have increased coordination following the growth of inter-county water 
management committees.  The focus of and the conclusions the authors draw in these 
case studies point to the centrality of spillovers and the importance of inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation in managing a shared resource.  These case studies show that inter-county 
management groups are important in enabling counties to negotiate for a reduction in the 
externalities imposed on them by their upstream neighbors. 
 
A. Can Counties Affect Water Quality? 
Although general environmental policy setting and enforcement is determined at 
the national and state levels, counties in Brazil have important powers over practices 
affecting the environment within their jurisdiction.  Federal law establishes guidelines, 
norms, and minimum standards of environmental policy, but the importance of county 
government participation in environmental policy making has been continually 
acknowledged by both state and federal law since the 1977 Federal Water Law first 
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established the principle of local participation in water quality management.  The Federal 
Constitution empowers counties to pass laws complementary to federal and state laws, to 
establish local environmental standards, and to enforce standards within their jurisdiction.   
While county governments cannot institute standards lower than those passed by the state 
and federal government, they may enforce norms that are more strict (Engenharia and 
Projetos 2006).  Virtually all counties in Brazil had either a ministry responsible for 
environmental issues or had an environment management council as of 2002, but less 
than 10% belonged to either an inter-county environmental management association or an 
inter-county water quality association (IBGE 2003). 
Lack of sewage treatment is the most important source of water pollution across 
the densely populated areas of Brazil.  Approximately 18 percent of counties report 
having open sewers which flood into major water systems.  Farm runoff is the most 
important cause of water pollution in rural areas.    Industrial dumping is also highlighted 
as a significant concern in approximately 10 percent of counties (see table 1). 
The federal government devolved responsibility for sanitation services to the 
states in the 1970s.  In the process of decentralization, states have allocated some 
authority over sanitation services to county governments.  County governments have an 
important role in determining to which areas to extend sanitation services in peripheral 
regions that lack access to the sewer network.  County governments also have the 
authority to either choose to continue publicly provided sanitation services through 
licensing them to the state sanitation agencies which are now privatized, or to implement 
their own sewage systems (Faria da Costa 2006).   
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 Counties are able to fine and tax their community members for activities which 
cause pollution.  In addition, they are able to forbid highly polluting practices and use 
zoning regulations to reduce direct runoff.  They also manage programs for trash 
collection and sewage treatment (see table 2).  The use of these enforcement mechanisms 
may not be evenly distributed within a county:  the county administration has an 
incentive to increase spending on enforcement of pollution restrictions in areas of the 
county where pollution will be most harmful to community members.   
  
B. The Process of Creating New Counties 
Brazil created a large number of new counties by splitting larger counties during 
each election cycle in the 1990s, after the power to form new counties was devolved from 
the federal government to the state governments in the 1988 Federal Constitution.  The 
reasons for creating new counties vary, but polls of mayors of new counties have 
highlighted the importance of disagreements over the amount of municipal funds used in 
the various districts of the original county, differences in economic activity across 
districts, and the large size of the original county (Bremaeker 1992).  Other research 
suggests that the split can occur for purely administrative reasons and in order to better 
represent the political affiliation of the district which leaves the original county (de 
Noronha 1995).  To the extent that counties have policy-making authority over any 
publicly provided good, the creation of new counties is a form of decentralization in the 
delivery of that public good (e.g. two smaller governments rather than one larger one are 
supplying the service to the same population).  
The process of creating new counties begins with a feasibility study on the 
projected solvency of the potential county and a motion for a referendum on the proposal 
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in the state legislature.  Both the district newly acquiring county status and the county 
being split must ratify the proposal in a referendum.  The referendums are followed by a 
state law passed by the state legislature and signed by the governor (Tomio 2002).   
Counties receive transfers from both the federal and the state governments, and 
the incentives to create new counties are high.  In addition to a portion of the income and 
industrial taxes collected in their jurisdiction, counties receive the Municipalities’ 
Participation Fund (FPM).  The amount transferred through the FPM is determined by 
population with 18 set steps, and the lowest amount is awarded to municipalities with less 
than 10,188 citizens.  In response to the proliferation of new small municipalities, in 1996 
a federal law was passed setting quotas for FPM by state (Tomio 2002).   
The process of choosing counties to re-district is not random, and not necessarily 
uncorrelated with variables that affect water quality.  For example, if a county is split due 
to significant ethnic or wealth differences between the separating district and the districts 
remaining in the county, the two new smaller counties may be more homogenous than the 
original larger county, which in itself may reallocate resources towards a variety of public 
goods including pollution abatement (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999).  This is just an 
example of another mechanism that relates county splitting to water quality changes 
(along with spillovers and changes in local budgets), and therefore not a concern for the 
estimation, and may actually help explain the net effect of decentralization on pollution.  
An example of a different type of concern would be that counties with strong leadership 
or community involvement across districts are less likely to have districts separating, so 
that water quality would in general be lower in split areas.  Since our regressions control 
for a full set of location fixed effects and inference is based only on changes in water 
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quality over time in the same river segment, such level differences in water quality are 
not of concern for bias in the estimates.  This may indicate, however, that our empirical 
identification comes from a ‘special’ set of counties, which limits the applicability of our 
results to other contexts.    
The major concern here is that the non-random process of creating new counties 
may be endogenous to changes in water quality.  The most straightforward example is 
that if districts with large increases in population density are more likely to separate from 
the county, then changes in boundary crossings would be correlated with changes in 
water quality for an independent reason (since population density likely contributes to 
pollution). We address this particular concern by always controlling for the changing 
population density in all counties between each pair of stations, but some residual 
concern might remain if the relationship between population density changes and county 
splitting is non-linear (e.g. counties split only after exceeding some population threshold).  
The next section therefore develops a theoretical model to predict the exact spatial pattern 
of pollution one might expect to see under endogenous population-based county splitting. 
This leads to an empirical test of the specific type of endogeneity we model, and our data 
strongly favor the case that strategic behavior rather than spurious endogeneity is the 
main driver of the pollution spillovers results we report.    
 One might also be concerned about other unobserved variables correlated with 
both county splitting and water quality changes.  It is worthwhile noting that given the 
specific pattern of pollution spillovers we report (pollution increases at an increasing rate 
as the river heads toward the exit border and pollution decreases after it crosses the 
border), such observed variables would have to take a very specific form.  It is difficult to 
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rule out all possibilities,  In the absence of a suitable instrument for county splitting, we 
adapt a bias estimation technique developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) to 
estimate the maximum bias in our coefficients of interest stemming from unobservable 
factors affecting county splitting using as a guide the amount of selection in county splits 
that is due to other regressors that we have data on (such as population density, GDP 
etc.).4  We find that the estimated bias cannot explain away the strong spillover effects 
we uncover.    
 
4. A Theoretical Model of Pollution on a River 
We model a river on a unit line flowing from left to right, with a population that 
consumes and pollutes distributed along the river according to a PDF f(x) (see Figure 1).  
A person at location x consumes qx, and there is a one-to-one relationship between this 
consumption and the pollution he emits into the river.  Any pollution emitted at point x 
adversely affects people located downstream of x.  This pollution exponentially decays as 
the river flows, and thus the pollution “felt” at downstream point t of the emission qx is 
)( xt
x eq
−−⋅ .  A social planner decides how much consumption (and pollution) to allow at 
each point within her jurisdiction by trading off the utility of consumption against the 
welfare cost of the pollution downstream, but subject to the constraint that pollution at 
any point x does not exceed 
_
q , some natural limit on the ‘need to pollute’.  We begin 
                                                 
4 Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) study the effect of catholic school attendance in the presence of selection 
into catholic schools and the absence of an appropriate instrument for entry into catholic schools. There’s 
an implicit assumption in this technique that the regressors we have data on are a random subset of all 
potential regressors correlated with both county splitting and water quality changes.  This is quite a 
reasonable assumption, and in fact, we have data on population density, which is the most likely culprit for 
creating an endogeneity bias in our estimates.  
 17
with the case where the entire river falls under one jurisdiction, and later examine the 
effects of jurisdictional splits. 
A. Pollution Prior to a Jurisdictional Split 
At each point x the social planner chooses qx to maximize the utility that the mass 
of individuals at x receive from consuming qx net of the harm the associated pollution 





xx dttfeqquxfW   (subject to 
_
qqx ≤ ) (1) 





x dttfequxf  (2) 
where λ is the shadow value of the 
_
q  constraint.  In the simple case of the uniformly 
distributed population of mass 1 and log utility [ )ln()( xx qqu = ], this yields the following 






= .5  The 
solid blue line in figure 2 plots *xq  for a 
_
q  value of 40.  Pollution and consumption 
allowances increase to the right, since the harm caused by upstream emissions is greater 
than the harm caused by emissions close to the exiting border out of the jurisdiction.   
The actual pollution level felt at any point y on the river is the accumulation of all 





)(* )()(  (3) 
                                                 
5 *xq switches from )1(1
1
xe −−−
 to q  at the point )11ln(1
q




gets too large.  The q constraint is added to the model only for convenience – to avoid arbitrarily large 
pollution at the edge of the river.  All our numerical simulations assume q =40, and at this value x is very 
close to the river’s exit point out of the jurisdiction, so q does not play a numerically important role. 
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Even though there is no simple analytical solution for this integral, we can numerically 
integrate and plot the solutions for P(y) in figure 3.  The figure shows that pollution level 
in a river increases as we head towards a river’s exit point out of the jurisdiction, due to 
the county’s strategic optimizing behavior to limit harm to its own constituents. 
B. Effect of a Jurisdictional Split on Pollution 
 To examine the effect of a jurisdictional split on water pollution, we introduce a 
county split at 0.5 and solve for  uxq  and )(yP
u for the upstream county, which is now 
only concerned about the harm its consumption decisions cause to its own constituents 
located in the interval [0,0.5], and for  dxq  and )(yP
d for the downstream county, which 
is concerned about its own constituents at [0.5,1].  The dashed line in figure 2 shows that 
residents of the upstream half of the county are allowed to consume and pollute much 
more after the split, but the split causes no change in downstream county residents’ 
pollution.  The upstream county allows its residents to pollute more since part of the harm 
caused by the pollution is now an externality on the downstream county that does not 
enter its own optimizing calculus, whereas the downstream county experiences no such 
change in the tradeoff between utility and perceived harm.  Figure 3 shows that overall 
pollution level in the river increases due to these “negative spillovers” brought about by 
the county split, and that downstream county residents are far worse off.  The pollution 
function is no longer monotonically increasing since there is a sharp discontinuity in the 
consumption-pollution tradeoff calculus for the two social planners making decisions 
immediately to the left and to the right of the split.  
C. Endogenous County Splitting with a Triangular Population Distribution 
 As discussed in the previous section, a key concern with our estimation strategy to 
identify the effect of decentralization on pollution spillovers is the possibility of 
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endogenous splitting of jurisdictions in areas with high population density (where 
pollution problems are worsening for an independent reason).  Under the particular form 
of welfare maximizing behavior by the county authority that we’ve assumed in the 
theory, there is actually no such endogeneity problem since the authority would respond 
to (say) a doubling of the population by simply halving each person’s consumption 
allowance.  With twice the population, each person’s emissions cause double the harm, 
and so the county authority forces its citizens to cut back on consumption.  However, to 
guide a careful empirical strategy we do want to allow for such endogeneity, so we will 
now assume that each person at location x emits εx in addition to the qx, but that the εx 
emissions are un-monitored and beyond the control of the county authority.  Thus we will 
model ‘endogeneity’ as follows: when population density increases at a location, counties 
are likely to split there, but there is also an independent effect on pollution at those 
locations since the ε component of emissions are now larger there.  We have to also relax 
the assumption of a uniform population distribution in order to effectively model 
increasing population density.   
 Imagine that population doubles (from mass 1 to 2), and that f(x) now takes the 
form of a symmetric triangular distribution, so that the largest increase in population 
density occurs right around 0.5:  
10.5for x)-(14  







xf           (4) 
We will examine the effect of a jurisdictional split at the location coincident with the 
peak of the distribution (at 0.5), since this is the form of endogeneity of greatest concern 
(i.e. that splits occur in areas where ε-type pollution increases for independent reasons).  
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The first-order conditions (2) yield the following solutions for pollution allowances in the 
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The dashed lines in Figure 4 plot the associated pollution function which only accounts 
for ‘strategic’ q-type pollution but not the unmonitored ε-type pollution.  Pollution 
increases very sharply upto point 0.5 (and this pollution function is steeper than the 
corresponding one for the uniform distribution of population) because the strategic 
motives to pollute more and the effects of increasing population density coincide at 
locations just left of the split. Unlike the uniform distribution case, pollution 
monotonically decreases downstream of the split since the downstream county, 
concerned about the welfare of its citizens, allows relatively little new pollution within its 
border, and the unusually large inflows of pollution from the upstream county decay as 
the river flows.  This particular difference in the shapes of the dashed blue lines in figures 
3 and 4 (non-monotonic quadratic for the uniform distribution versus monotonically 
decreasing pollution downstream of county borders for the triangular distribution) yields 
a simple empirical test of the basic premise of the endogeneity concern – that county 
splits occur in areas of high population density.  The intuition for the test is that with 
population-density based splitting, county borders are likely to be located in areas with 
high population density, so that when we move away downstream of borders, population 
density decreases, which lowers observed pollution.  As we will see in the next section, 
our data are consistent with the population density based splitting, so the basic premise of 
this form of endogeneity is borne out. 
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 Figure 4 also plots a “total pollution function” in solid orange, which aggregates 
the q-type with the unmonitored ε-type pollution.  This function corresponds to the 
pollution that will be observed in the data (since the data is just “total pollution” 
aggregated across q-type and ε-type).    The three panels of figure 4 vary the assumed 
levels of ε-type pollution.  Since ε is the independent effect of population density on 
pollution that has nothing to do with strategic behavior, increasing values of ε correspond 
to assuming that larger amounts of “endogeneity” are present in our empirical analysis – 
that our regressions merely pick up fluctuations in pollution caused by population density 
changes that have nothing to do with strategic spillovers.  The idea is to compare the 
shapes of the pollution functions under differing degrees of endogeneity to the 
empirically estimated shape of the pollution function to see whether the estimates based 
on the data correspond to large or small endogeneity concerns.  
 As we add larger amounts of ‘endogeneity’ (i.e. ε-type pollution), the shape of the 
total pollution function changes: total pollution keeps increasing to the right of the 
border, replacing the monotonically decreasing function associated with no endogeneity. 
This is because population density is largest close to the border, and this is where the 
emissions of per-person ε-type pollution is the greatest.  A comparison of the shapes of 
the solid blue and the dashed orange lines across the three panels of figure 4 yields an 
empirical test of the quantitative importance of the endogeneity concern.  If the 
correlation between distance to border to pollution is driven by population density rather 
than true strategic behavior, then the estimated relationship between pollution levels and 
distance downstream of border should follow a non-linear inverted-U shaped pattern.  
Observing a negative linear relationship between downstream distance and pollution 
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would be more consistent with evidence of strategic spillovers.  The key insight here is 
that if county splits occur in high density areas, that has implications for the spatial 
patterns of “endogenous” population density driven pollution around borders.  Examining 
those spatial patterns allows us to make some empirical inferences on the extent to which 
the correlation is driven by population changes rather than strategic behavior by counties 
in the presence of spillovers.  We allow for non-linear effects of downstream distance in 
our empirical work, and always find distance traversed downstream has a linear negative 
effect. The empirical results reported in this paper are thus likely evidence of strategic 
behavior as opposed to spurious correlation due to changing density. 
          
5. Empirical Analysis 
A. An Example of our Identification Strategy 
Figure 5 presents example maps of the evolution of county boundaries from the 
state of Rio de Janeiro that help to illustrate our basic identification strategy. The points 
A, B and F in this diagram are locations of three water quality monitoring stations on the 
same river segment that flows from A to F.  To explain the change in water quality from 
B to F in 1991, the three variables of interest are the location of the upstream station 
relative to the nearest exiting border (distance BD), the location of the downstream 
station relative to the nearest entering border (distance DF), and the number of county 
boundary crossings (1, at point D).  Under the strategic spillovers logic, the pollution 
level at upstream point B is expected to be higher the closer B is to the exiting border, 
and the change is pollution from B to F should be more positive the more county 
boundaries that are crossed in between (e.g. figure 3). The effect of distance DF on the 
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pollution level at downstream point F is less clear, and it’s possibly non-monotonic 
depending on the nature of the population distribution around the river (figures 3 and 4).   
It is difficult to empirically identify these spillover effects because for two 
different river segments of similar lengths located in two regions the number of boundary 
crossings and distances of stations to borders would be correlated with average county 
size and other county characteristics in those regions. Attenuation rate of pollution may 
also differ across station pairs, and has the potential to bias the results as geography may 
be more similar across counties in areas where counties are smaller (and therefore 
boundaries are more frequently crossed by the river).  Since we have access to multiple 
water quality measures over time for each station, one potential solution is to add fixed 
effects for each river segment in our econometric models to control for fixed differences 
in county characteristics. However, our variables of interest – border crossings and 
distances to borders – are also usually ‘fixed,’ which implies that their effects would not 
be identified once location specific fixed effects are added.  Luckily in Brazil we can take 
advantage of county splits which change distances to borders and border crossings over 
time for the same pair of monitoring stations even when the locations of those stations 
remain fixed. In this example, a district of Barra Mansa county outlined in red was 
recognized as a separate county by state law after the 1994 elections.  Thus the distance 
of the upstream station B to the nearest exiting border decreased from BD to BC, and the 
number of border crossings for the segment BF increased from 1 to 2 in the middle panel 
of Figure 5. Prior to 1994 the Barra Mansa leadership was trading off the benefits of 
pollution allowance around B against the costs of pollution to all downstream 
constituents located along segment BD.  After 1994 many of those downstream users 
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were no longer Barra Mansa voters, and thus the political calculus that determines 
pollution allowances at B changes.  Our regressions with the river segment fixed effects 
identify the change in pollution measured at B as a result of the change in B’s distance to 
the nearest exiting border.  Also, since the two new counties now have greater incentives 
to pollute just upstream of their respective exiting borders (i.e. close to points C and D), 
we should observe that after the split, water quality deteriorates more as the river flows 
from B to F due to such strategic spillovers.  However, if the county split implies more 
money available for sanitation spending in the new smaller counties, or counties with 
more homogenous populations, there may be countervailing positive changes in water 
quality between B and F. 
The bottom panel in figure 5 shows that in 2001 there was an additional split that 
reduced the distance of the downstream station from the nearest entering border.  This 
second type of split allows us to identify the effect of downstream distance in the 
presence of river segment fixed effects.  Since our dependent variable is measured as the 
change from upstream pollution to downstream pollution ( ud BODBODBOD −=∆ ), we 
expect a positive coefficient on the distance from the upstream station to its nearest 
exiting border, and a negative coefficient on the distance between a downstream station 
and its nearest entering border.  Further, based on the model in the previous section, we 
expect the effect of decreased pollution enforcement near exiting borders to be nonlinear: 
at stations very close to exiting borders, the jump in pollution should be larger than at 




Our unbalanced panel is comprised of water quality measures taken at 321 
upstream-downstream station pairs across Brazil (see figure 6) in monthly intervals 
between 1975 and 2004, which results in an unbalanced panel of about 9,000 individual 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) observations.  BOD measures the amount of oxygen 
consumed by micro-organisms which feed on organic matter in rivers.  Higher BOD is 
associated with increased bacterial count and organisms in the water, which accumulate 
wherever there is a high level of pollution from organic matter.  It is commonly used to 
measure pollution from industrial, sewage, and runoff sources, and indicates the general 
health of the river. Please see the Appendix for more details.  Table 3 shows that BOD 
concentrations in Brazilian rivers are relatively high on average.  Rivers with BOD 
greater than 4 mg/l is considered unacceptable for recreational use in the United States, 
and 40% of observations in our sample fall above this level, with a mean concentration of 
above 3.5.    
  Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) modeling, we measure changes in 
BOD as the river flows from an upstream water quality monitoring station to a 
downstream station, and catalog the number of jurisdictional (e.g. county or municipio) 
boundaries the river crosses (see figure 7), distances traversed in each jurisdiction, a 
variety of political, economic, demographic and budgetary characteristics of each 
jurisdiction, and other aquatic conditions such as elevation, pollution attenuation and 
dilution through tributary inflows in addition to region, climate and seasonal controls (see 
table 3).     
Brazil has re-drawn county boundaries three times between 1991 and 2001, which 
implies that each water quality observation for a station falls into one of four different 
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county boundary regimes.  The number of counties in Brazil has increased from 4492 in 
1991 to 5562 in 2001.  We merge digital maps of water monitoring stations, rivers, 
elevation and flow vectors, and the four different county boundary definitions in order to 
(a) identify the direction of water flow between each pair of stations (to classify them as 
upstream or downstream), (b) define river segments between station pairs, (c) identify the 
counties crossed by each river segment in each year, and (d) measure distances traversed 
within each of those counties.  32 of the 321 station pairs in the sample experienced at 
least one border change during the sample period.  1800 of the 9000 water quality 
observations (i.e. 20%) are for those 32 station pairs (see table 4).  The river segments 
defined by station pairs cross 4 counties on average. 
 
5. Results 
Our regressions use each upstream-downstream station pair (or equivalently, the 
river segment in between) as the unit of observation, and the dependent variable measures 
the change in BOD from the upstream to the downstream station: BOD∆ =(BODd – 
BODu).  Our primary estimating equation is the following station-pair (stp) fixed effects 














X is a vector time-varying control variables that have multiple observations for 
each station pair, including population density, GDP, area size of the county, all 
measured separately for the county where the upstream monitoring station is located, the 
county where the downstream station is located, and distance-weighted averaged for the 
 27
other “intermediate” counties that the river segment flows through while getting from the 
upstream to the downstream station.  We add year effects to account for the trend towards 
decentralization over time in Brazil, and 96 basin-month dummies (8 water basins x 12 
months) to control for climactic varations  Pollution attenuation on a particular river is a 
function of distance, rainfall, flow rate, water depth, elevation, and river gradient.  
Because many of the factors which affect the rate of pollution attenuation are geographic 
and non-time varying, station pair fixed effects controls for these issues.  When omitting 
the fixed effect, we directly control for flow rate, water depth, elevation, and river 
gradient, which are obtained using GIS modeling on map data provided by the USGS.  
GIS techniques also allows us to measure distance along the river between stations (and 
in most cases this is longer than straight-line crow-fly distance). 
We typically expect upstream and downstream county characteristics to have 
opposite effects on the change in water quality.  For example, an increase in population 
density in either the downstream county or in counties located in between should lead to 
an increase in pollution downstream (BODd – BODu increases), but holding constant 
downstream density, an increase in population density upstream should increase BODu, 
thereby decreasing (BODd – BODu).  Economic activity could affect water quality in 
either direction: with higher GDP per capita the demand for clean water may increase, 
but greater economic activity may be associated with greater incidence of industrial 
waste.    
The net effect of the number of border crossings will depend on the relative 
strengths of the spillover effect versus other changes associated with county splitting such 
as increases in sanitation budgets or a change in population heterogeneity.  The first 
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model in table 5 shows that the net effect of border crossings is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero, but that the point estimate is negative (i.e. water quality 
improves with a larger number of border crossings).   
With pollution externalities that are internalized within a political jurisdiction but 
not across jurisdictions, BODu should decrease with the distance traversed within the 
upstream county.  If the upstream county strategically pollutes closer to their exiting 
border due to the spillovers present, we would expect BODu to be greater (and therefore 
∆BOD= BODd - BODu to be lower) at low values for Distance_upstream. Hence the 
coefficient β2 is expected to be positive in the presence of spillovers.  Conversely, we 
expect BODd to generally decrease with distance traversed within the downstream county 
(which decreases BODd – BODu and leads to a negative β3), but the model in section 4 
raises the possibility that this latter effect is non-monotonic and ambiguous.       
The last two columns in table 5 provide strong support for spillovers and strategic 
polluting behavior by counties.  The negative coefficient β3 in column 2 implies that the 
pollution level decreases by 1.4% for every extra kilometer further the river travels before 
BOD is recorded in the downstream county.  Conversely, BOD increases by 1.5% in the 
upstream county every kilometer closer we get to the exiting border.  Our conversations 
with water management practitioners in Brazil indicate that the primary mechanism 
underlying this effect is that counties are less forceful in enforcing pollution permit 
regulations for firms and municipalities in downstream locations relative to portions of 
the county further upstream (and it’s not that pollution intensive industries are physically 
relocated downstream).   
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If the upstream county is behaving strategically, they would want to dump all the 
pollution very close to the river’s exit point out of the county.  In that case, we would 
expect the pollution effect of distance traversed upstream to be larger when that distance 
is very small (i.e. when we are close to the border).  In table 6, where we allow for a non-
linear effect of upstream_distance show precisely this type of behavior. Within 5 
kilometers of the exit border, getting closer to the border increases pollution by 18.6% 
every kilometer, whereas outside this range getting closer to the border increases 
pollution by only 2.3% per kilometer, and this difference is highly statistically 
significant.  A similar pattern emerges when we split the effect by a 10-kilometer-of-exit-
border cutoff (7.6% within 10km of border, and 2.8% outside that range).  When we 
allow for more cut-offs in the piece-wise linear specification in column 3, we see that 
pollution increases 3.1% every kilometer closer we get to the border, but that this 
increase jumps to 6.4% within 10km of the exit border, and jumps further to 21% per 
kilometer within 5km of the river’s exit point out of the jurisdiction. The pairwise 
differences between these 3 coefficients are jointly statistically significant. We illustrate 
this pattern for the pollution function with a heuristic diagram in Figure 8.  Pollution 
keeps increasing more and more dramatically the closer we get to the exiting border.        
 The coefficient on the variable ‘distance traversed in the downstream county is 
always estimated to be negative. We find very little evidence of any non-linear effects.  
Taken together with the predictions of the theoretical model in section 4, this implies that 
these spillovers results are not likely being driven by some spurious correlation between 
pollution and border locations stemming from population density.  There is evidence of 
strategic behavior.  
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 The specifications in Table 7 uses only stations close to a county border, and 
these results are supportive of the story of the apparent trade-off between spillovers and 
offsetting budgetary impacts inherent in the process of decentralization.  When we 
condition on pollution measures taken only at stations close to the border where the 
spillovers and county strategic behavior is strongest, we find that the net effect of 
decentralization (i.e. additional boundary crossings) is to increase pollution levels.  The 
coefficient on border crossings is +0.11 in this restricted sample, compared to -0.15 in the 
full sample.  In this restricted sample, spillovers are also quite large (BOD increases by 
21% every kilometer closer the river gets to the exit border), which suggests that strategic 
spillovers dominate the countervailing beneficial effects of decentralization, leading to an 
overall negative effect for border crossings. 
   In table 8 we check whether extreme values of BOD drives the results, but the 
coefficients of interest appear robust to excluding the extreme 6% (top 3% and bottom 
3%) and the extreme 10% of observations.  The coefficients of interest are also robust to 
excluding the cases of zero border crossings between two monitoring stations. 
 Table 9 presents some ancillary evidence of the budgetary impacts of county 
splitting.  The county fixed effects regression shows that when counties are split, the new 
smaller counties see the county health and sanitation spending increase by R$13.2 per 
person over the spending in the larger county that they were a part of in the previous year.  
For the average county in Brazil, this translates into a 20% increase in expenditures.  
Thus the story of water quality improving due to increased local government budgets 
following decentralization, and offsetting the degradation due to greater spillovers 
appears plausible. 
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 If some unobserved characteristics of counties is correlated with both changes in 
water quality and with county splits, that could introduce some bias in the estimated 
effects.  Such an unobserved characteristic would have to take a very specific form in 
order to explain the non-linear patterns in the pollution function that we estimate, and as 
our theoretical model coupled with the empirical results show, something that shares the 
characteristics of population density would not do.  If such an unobserved variable exists, 
one way to deal with the issue directly would be to identify an instrumental variable for 
county splits that is uncorrelated with water quality changes, but no plausible instrument 
is available.  Therefore, to deal with the issue less directly, we borrow an idea from 
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) to estimate the potential size of the bias stemming from 
some such unobservable using the amount of selection from the observed explanatory 
variables as a guide.   
Using the Altonji et al. (2005) estimation strategy for this purpose requires us to 
make a few key assumptions.  First, we assume that the observed variables (such as GDP 
changes and population density changes) are a random subset of the set of variables that 
potentially determine county splits (i.e. changes in the number of borders crossed).  
Second, we assume that there is a large enough set of variables determining border 
crossings, and that no other unobservable variable completely dominates the 
determination of border crossings or water quality changes.  While these are restrictive 
assumptions, we do not believe that they are necessarily violated in our dataset:  there are 
many possible reasons that counties may split, and GDP and population density are likely 
to explain splits at least as well as the other potential causes of county splits.  
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Table 10 presents a summary of the bias estimate results.  Both variables 
measuring distance traversed by the river in the upstream county and the downstream 
county (the two variables that had non-zero statistically significant impacts in our 
regressions) appear to be slightly biased away from zero, and therefore need to be 
adjusted. However, the size of the maximum possible bias is small relative to the 
estimated coefficients. Our estimate of a 1.4% increase in BOD for every kilometer 
closer we get to the exiting border from the last column in table 4 gets revised to a 0.9% 
increase in BOD per kilometer.  And after the adjustment on the variable measuring 
distance traversed in the downstream county, pollution is estimated to decrease by 1.8% 
(coming down from 2.4%) for every extra kilometer further the river travels before BOD 
is recorded in the downstream county.   
 In table 11, we test our model against a “naïve” “quasi cross-sectional” 
specification where we do not control for station-pair fixed effects, to assess whether 
there is any omitted variable bias from the unobserved fixed characteristics of locations.  
Coefficients on the variables of interest are substantially different in the naïve 
specification, indicating a need for caution in testing for spillovers using cross-sectional 
variation across localities.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
Make comments on Coase Theorem, and what is going on in Brazil recently with the river 
basin committees.  
This paper provides evidence of opposing effects on the quality of an important 
publicly provided good of the particular form of decentralization that results from the re-
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districting of jurisdictions.  The results suggest that decentralization increases the 
incentives for counties to allow pollution close to borders, but that this effect is wholly 
offset by some other beneficial side-effects of the process of decentralization, such as 
increases in local budgets and (possibly) the replacing of a heterogenous jurisdiction with 
multiple homogenous communities.   
We find evidence of selective enforcement of pollution regulations:  water quality 
is more likely to degrade between two stations if the upstream station is farther from its 
nearest exiting border, and more likely to improve between two stations if the 
downstream station is farther from its upstream border.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that counties will enforce pollution more in areas where their constituents will 
be more likely to be harmed from increased levels of pollution.  The spillovers and 
strategic behavior by counties is largest closest to jurisdictional borders, and suggests that 
policy-makers and institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank promoting 
decentralization ought to be more vigilant in assessing the potential spillover costs of 
decentralization close to border areas.  Our results also suggest that there could be 
important gains from cooperation between upstream and downstream communities 
through negotiation and transfers.  Strategic cooperation among counties in pollution 
abatement is a potentially interesting avenue for future research. 
The results described above survive several robustness checks.  There is a 
remaining possibility that the main source of identification – county border crossings – is 
driven by unobservables that are correlated with changes in water quality.  If the amount 
of selection on border crossings based on the other observed variables is any guide, then 
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these potential unobservables explain only a portion of the negative cross-border 
spillover effects reported in this paper. 
In summary, while there may be many advantages and disadvantages to 
decentralizing the management of water resources, this paper shows that the inter-
jurisdictional spillovers generated from county-level management of water can be large 
in magnitude, particularly close to borders.  In assessing which is the proper geographic 
or administrative unit that ought to be in charge of a publicly provided good, the potential 
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Appendix:  Chemical Properties of Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is a measurement of organic pollution in a 
water body.  BOD increases as micro-organisms accumulate to degrade organic material.  
BOD is expected to have trends opposite to those of dissolved oxygen:  in areas where 
dissolved oxygen is high, organic pollution is low, and BOD levels will also be low.  
High levels of organic pollution and BOD are associated with river eutrophication.7   
Organic pollution may be derived from a variety of sources.  Common organic 
pollutants include: phenols which are common in industrial food manufacturing, 
surfactants which are a by-product of detergents and are common in both household and 
industrial wastes, sewage, agricultural and urban run-off, and domestic waste.8  Industries 
which emit pollutants to which BOD levels are particularly sensitive include:  food 
processing, oil extraction and refining (sugar cane refining is a particularly large industry 
in Brazil, and untreated waste waters from sugar refineries carry high organic pollution 
loads), pulp and paper industries, and textiles.  BOD is also sensitive to pollutants from 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, mining, metallurgy, and machine production.9  
Water Type BOD Level 
Unpolluted 2 
Highly Polluted 10 
Treated Sewage 20-100 
Raw Sewage 600 
Industrial Waste up to 25,00010 
BOD is an approximation of theoretical oxygen demand, or the total oxygen 
which would be necessary to decompose the organic matter present in the sample.  It is 
measured as the oxygen consumption in a given water sample at twenty degrees Celsius 
over a period of five days.   Consumption is determined as the difference in dissolved 
oxygen content between the beginning of the incubation period and at the end of five 
days.  A gestation period of five days is given as the oxygen consumption of the micro-
organisms is initially high, but decreases as organic pollutant concentrations decrease.11   
Attenuation rates of organic pollution depend on a host of local factors.  Weather 
can affect decomposition rates as low temperatures increase the half-life of organic 
pollution and slow the process of decomposition.  High levels of water evaporation may 
increase the concentration of organic pollution while increased rainfall may contribute to 
the dilution of the pollution loads.  High levels of rainfall may, however, also lead to 
local flooding and increased contamination from erosion.  Geological factors such as 
local soil and rock types affect the absorption of pollutants into the river bed.  
Geographical factors such as slope, elevation, discharge, and depth affect attenuation; 
water velocity increases the oxidation of the organic pollutants in the water—high flow 
rates cause increased churning and oxygenation.12    
 
                                                 
7 Chapman, 1996, p. 276-278. 
8 Chapman, 1996, p. 102-111. 
9 Chapman, 1996.  P. 122. 
10 Chapman, 1996, p. 88. 
11 Hounslow, 1995.  P. 302. 
12 Chapman, 1996, p. 246-276 
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Figure 1: Model of a River 
 
 



















Figure 3: The Pollution Function P(y) for a County with Uniformly Distributed 
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Figure 4: Endogenous Population Density Based Split under a Triangular Population Distribution:  
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Table 1. County-Reported Causes of Water Pollution  
Mining 235 
Oil and gas from boats 81 
Animal Waste 832 
Materials from the Processing of Sugar 160 
Industrial Dumping 521 
Domestic Sewage 1595 
Poor Solid Waste Management 821 
Poor enforcement of river pollution regulations 648 
Poor enforcement of underground water rights licensing 228 
Use of Pesticides and Fertilizers 901 
Others 160 
Total Counties reporting Water Pollution 2121 
*Counts are as of 2002.  There were 5,560 counties in Brazil in 2002.  Source:  IBGE 
 
Table 2. County Actions to Reduce Pollution  
Fining Households with Inadequate Sewer Systems 2462 
Fining Companies with Inadequate Industrial Waste Management 
Systems 1007 
Monitoring of Potentially Polluting Industrial Activities 596 
Taxing Mining Industries 1027 
Taxing Automobiles 104 
Management of Toxic Waste 483 
Trash Collection Program 1654 
Recycling Program 1082 
Creation of Sewers 1949 
Other 564 
*Counts are as of 2002.  There were 5,560 counties in Brazil in 2002.  Source:  IBGE. 
 
Table 3:  Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BOD level in Upstream Station 4.14 5.17 0.20 42
BOD level in Downstream Station 3.85 4.73 0.20 39
Difference in BOD levels -0.29 5.31 -39.17 37
Log difference in BOD levels -0.07 0.90 -3.66 3.33
Variables of Interest
Number of Counties passed through 4.33 5.34 0.00 54.00
Total Distance between Stations (in km) 80.73 112.67 0.05 1,147.87
Distance from upstream Station to Nearest 
Downstream Border (in km) 11.18 9.28 0.02 39.32
Distance from nearest upstream border to 
Downstream Station (in km) 11.19 10.41 0.02 37.93
Control Variables
GDP of the Upstream County in millions of R$ 
(constant 2000) source:  IPEA 560.67 1,587.30 4.26 21,781.34
upstream and downstream stations in millions of 
R$ (constant 2000) source: IPEA 600.54 1,538.60 1.14 13,456.99
GDP of the Downstream county in millions of R$ 
(constant 2000) source:  IPEA 714.66 1,927.02 4.26 26,273.94
Population Density of Upstream County (People 
per square kilometer) source:  SIDRA 148.23 518.21 0.72 6,506.20
Average population density in counties traversed 
by river between Upstream and Downstream 
Station weighted by distance (People per square 
kilometer) source: SIDRA 164.14 558.33 0.72 6,506.20
Population Density of Downstream County 
(People per square kilometer) source:  SIDRA 198.29 729.76 0.68 6,744.58
Size of Upstream County (square kilometers) 
source:  IBGE 688.50 1,331.06 0.06 17,777.47
between Upstream and Downstream Stations 
(square kilometers) source:  IBGE 690.59 1,302.00 0.08 17,777.47
Size of Downstream County (square kilometers) 
source:  IBGE 728.00 1,537.69 0.07 17,777.47
Station pair fixed Effects 321 27.87
Basin-Month Dummies 96 93.19
Year Fixed Effects 29 308.48
Geographic Controls
(source: USGS)
Flow Accumulation at the Upstream Station 54,422.37 147,456.70 0 668,018
Flow Accumulation at the Downstream Station 96,162.39 209,616.10 0 816,557
Elevation at the Upstream Station 368.00 281.88 1 1,204
Elevation at the Downstream Station 303.82 261.49 1 941
Depth index at the Upstream Station 1,361.43 421.99 304 2,064
Depth Index at the Downstream Station 1,477.36 367.68 313 2,064
Slope at the Upstream Station 50.24 69.38 0 813
Slope at the Downstream Station 43.15 49.54 0 268
No. of Observations 
per groupNumber of groups
Table 4:  Changes in Number of Counties Passed Through
Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1,682 18.8 18.8
1 871 9.74 28.54
2 1,625 18.16 46.7
3 1,098 12.27 58.98
4 812 9.08 68.05
5 772 8.63 76.68
6 316 3.53 80.21
7 342 3.82 84.04
8 257 2.87 86.91
9 70 0.78 87.69
10 93 1.04 88.73




1804 20.17% 1777 24.46%
7142 79.83% 5487 75.54%
All Cases
Restricted to Cases where 
Border Crossings Occur
Observations at station pairs that did not 
experience a split
Traversed by River 
between stations
Station pairs
Station pairs that experienced at least one 
split during the sample period
Observations at station pairs that 
experienced at least one split







R-squared 0.046 0.044 0.048
N 8946 8946 8946
*All regressions include station pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, and basin-
month fixed effects.  Controls for GDP, population density, and county size 
upstream, downstream, and distance averaged between counties have been 
included but not reported.  Standard errors have been clustered at the station pair 
level.  The upper and lower 1% extreme values of the dependent variable have 
been removed from the sample.
Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Number of Counties Traversed
Distance Traversed in Upstream County before 
Reaching Exiting border
Distance Traversed in Downstream County from 
Entering Border to Monitoring Station
Table 6:  Nonlinear Effects of Distance
0.1860*** 0.2106*** 0.2067*** 0.1877***









-0.0140 -0.0129 -0.0131 -0.0564*







R-squared 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.047
N 8946 8946 8946 8946 8946
*** 1% **5% *10%
F-Statistic for Equality of Upstream Distance C 16.9 3.84 14.32 13.67 16.98
p-value 0 0.05 0 0 0
F-Statistic for Equality of Downstream Distance Coefficients 0.59
p-value 0.44
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is beyond 10km of exiting border)
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is beyond 5km but within 10km of 
exiting border)
Biochemical Oxygen Demand
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is within 5km of exiting border)
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is beyond 5km of exiting border) 
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is within 10km of exiting border)





Distance Traversed in Downstream County 
from Entering Border to Monitoring Station
Squared (Distance river traverses in 
downstream county)
Distance Traversed in Downstream County * 
(station is within 5km of the border)
Distance Traversed in Downstream County * 
(station is beyond 5km of the border)







R-squared 0.062 0.066 0.047 0.050 0.071 0.072
N 3077 3077 4767 4767 3478 3478
Downstream StationUpstream Station
Less than 5 km from 
the Border
Less than 10 km from 
the Border
Less than 5 km from 
Border
*All regressions include station pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, and basin-month fixed effects.  Controls for 
GDP, population density, and county size upstream, downstream, and distance averaged between counties have been 
included but not reported.  Standard errors have been clustered at the station pair level.  The upper and lower 1% 
extreme values have been removed from the sample.
Number of Counties Traversed
Distance Traversed in Upstream County 
before Reaching Exiting Border
Distance Traversed in Downstream County 
from Entering Border to Monitoring Station





-0.0065 -0.0500 -0.0131 -0.0607* -0.0142 -0.0608*









R-squared 0.055 0.052 0.054 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.065
N 8077 8077 8077 7477 7477 7477 7264 7264 7264
Distance Traversed in Downstream County 
from Entering Border to Monitoring Station
Alternative Cleaning Levels Cases of 0 border 
Crossings Removed3% Extreme Values 5% Extreme Values 
Number of Counties Traversed
Distance Traversed in Upstream County before 
Reaching Exiting Border
*All regressions include station pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, and basin-month fixed effects.  Controls for GDP, population 
density, and county size upstream, downstream, and distance averaged between counties have been included but not reported.  Standard 
errors have been clustered at the station pair level.  
Squared (Distance river traverses in 
downstream county)
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is beyond 5km but within 10km of 
exiting border)
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is beyond 10km of exiting border)
Distance river traverses in upstream county * 
(station is within 5km of exiting border)



















.008643 -0.004539 0.021895Distance Traversed in Upstream County before Reaching Exiting Border
Distance Traversed in Downstream County from 
Entering Border to Monitoring Station













‐0.0040 ‐0.0324** ‐0.0141 ‐0.0565*









R-squared 0.064 0.065 0.071 0.046 0.044 0.048
N 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939
county * (station is within 5km of 
exiting border)
county * (station is beyond 5km but 
within 10km of exiting border)
county * (station is beyond 10km of 
exiting border)
Squared (Distance river traverses in 
downstream county)
County from Entering Border to 
Monitoring Station
Table 11:  Comparison of River Fixed Effects Regression with Station Pair Fixed Effects Regression
River Fixed Effects Station Pair Fixed Effects
Distance Traversed in Upstream County 
before Reaching Exiting border
Number of Counties Traversed
